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Both authors agree that:
“Mental illness is not reducible to brain ill-
ness, even when mental phenomena have
their basis in the brain” (Schramme,
2013, p. 8) and
“ . . .because of the normative nature
of psychiatry, mental disorder cannot be
completely reduced to neuronal or molec-
ular processes. [. . . ] A mental state as
such may well be reducible to the brain,
but determining whether this very state is
(part of) a disorder or not, is nothing the
brain sciences can do.” (Stier, 2013, p. 8).
Therewith the authors deny the tacit
assumption according to which disease
in its proper sense can only be somati-
cal but never psychic. This posit, which
was propagated under the common term
of “Somatosepostulat” by the German
psychiatrist Kurt Schneider (Schneider,
1950) who dominated the post-war psy-
chiatry. Strangely enough the content of
Schneider’s posit was later on ascribed to
a falsely abridged citation of Griesinger
according to which mental diseases were
nothing but brain diseases (Griesinger,
1861). In fact he stressed in addition
that mental states (“Seelenzustände”) may
not be reduced to functional disturbances
of the brain (“Funktionszuständen des
Gehirns”).
Definitely no one who is familiar with
the second edition of Griesinger’s text-
book would call this distinguished author
to witness psychiatry as a special kind
of neurology. Moreover, if a mental dis-
ease is nothing but a neurological or a
somatic disease respectively, it was log-
ical mandatory to speak of “Somatic
Psychiatry.” Therefore it is disconcert-
ing that this term is absolutely unfamil-
iar. Instead, Schneider’s posit goes under
the disguise of the semantically inap-
propriate term of “Biological Psychiatry.”
Following this rational way of thought,
the unanswered question arises what
actually could be intended by the title
of the reviewed symposium “Biologism
within Psychiatry?” (Biologismus in der
Psychiatrie?) whereas—strictly speaking—
one ought to use the unusual or even
inexistent term of “Somatologism.”
By the way, to the present author whose
duty consisted only to comment on a freely
chosen article (out of six) it is cloudy
that neither in the workshop nor in any
one of the later on prepared articles an
answer was searched for the core issue
contained in the workshop-title whether
psychiatry suffers from biologism (or not).
This seemed to be avoided like a hot potato
since it would have implied a debate on
the outstanding semantics of “biological,”
biologistical or “somatical.”
Schramme states, that the recent publi-
cation of DSM V should give occasion for
the underlying philosophical aspects of the
language of mental disorder to make itself
clear within the psychiatric trade. He crit-
icizes DSM IV for using the term “mental
disorders”:
“Mental implies a Cartesian view of
the mind-body problem that minds and
brains are separable and entirely distinct
realms, an approach that is inconsistent
with modern philosophical and neurosci-
entific views.” (Schramme, 2013, p. 8).
One cannot but agree that the progress
of psychiatry depends on a logical and
semantical consistent terminology. But it
is just as disputable that this aim can be
reached by simply eliminating the collo-
quial term “mental” being used as a syn-
onym of “psychic” and/or an antonym
of “somatic.” Why should the concept of
mental illness be autonomous from somatic
medicine, as Schramme claims?
The real problem to be solved is
not an outdated Cartesian view of sub-
stance dualism, being scarcely advocated
by any of the contemporary psychi-
atrists, but the prevailing materialistic
monism or eliminative reductionism (e.g.,
Paul and Patricia Churchland, Armstrong,
Quine Ryle, Skinner, Crick etc.) which
is being camouflaged by the term “biol-
ogy/biological” being ill-posed because
opposite to the sense intended.
There is only one epistemological solu-
tion which goes back to Spinoza (1890).
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Among the contemporary exponents of
this solution the best known is Habermas
(Habermas, 2004) who prefers to speaks
of “Epistemic dualism.” Another notion of
this concept which dispels the myth of
the unsolvable mind-brain problem is that
of “Aspektdualismus” (Ulrich, 1990, 1997,
2006a,b, 2013).
About a decade ago a German psychi-
atric chair holder wrote about his vision
of an integrated clinical-neuroscientific
field with psychiatry as a special focus
but no longer existing as an autonomous
field (Maier, 2002). The Psychiatrist was
redefined as a Clinical Neuroscientist or
Clinical Psychopharmacologist.
Recently the director of a renowned
Max-Planck-Institute for Psychiatry con-
fessed in an interview that he surely
was a better chemist than psychiatrist
(Holsboer, 2005). By an editorial, enti-
tled: “Are we still in need of psychiatry
as a special field within medicine?” Ulrich
(Ulrich, 2006a) demanded that psychia-
trists should discourage any attempt to
abandon psychiatry as a distinct disci-
pline. He referred to the demand of Aspect
Dualism being valid for medicine as a
whole. Accordingly, “either-or interroga-
tions” have to be replaced by “as-well-as”
ones. Thus, it was undue to beg the ques-
tion whether a hysteria is a brain disease
or a psychological disease, or whether a
depressive disorder is a biochemical or a
psycho-social disorder. Such nominalistic
definitions are equally misguided as the
question whether an altarpiece should be
labelled as an antique or a sacred object.
By a recent monograph Ulrich defined
Psychiatry both as a Biological Natural
Science and a Humane Discipline (Ulrich,
2013).
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